In this book, Hittinger seeks to provide a critique of the "new natural law theory" developed over the past two decades by Germain G. Grisez and, to a lesser degree , by John M. Finnis . Grisez's articulation of the position began in the early 1960s with the publication of his Contraception and the Na tural Law, continued with the publication of major articles and massive books concerned with abortion , euthanasia and other issues , and , while still developing toda y, culminated in the 1983 publication of his Christian Moral PrinCiples. the first of a projected four-volume work in moral theology. In Christian Moral Principles. Grisez not only summari zed his theory of natural law, but also showed how the natural law is brought to completion by the redeeming act of Jesus Christ. Finnis has presented the position in two major works, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) and Fundamentals of Ethics (1983) and in several major articles.
Hittinger correctly observes that Grisez has emp loyed more than one term to refer to basic human goods, calling them "possibilities," "p urp oses," "values." a nd "ideals" as well as "goods" (cf. H , p. 40). But Hittinger (ibid.) also asserts that Grisez calls these basic goods "inclinations" and "tendencies," and elsewhere (H, p. 55) he writes as follows: ". . all th e goods are defined as actio ns which are attractive to the agent" (emphasis added). But Grisez never refers to the basic goods of human persons as " inclinations" or "tendencies." Rather, with St. Thomas (cf. Summa Theologiae, 1-2, q. 94, a. 2) he refers to the basic or natural inclinations or tendencies within human perso ns, orienting them to the goods perfective of them. T he goods, as Grisez sees it (again along with St. Thomas) are "ends", not inclinat ions. Nor does Grisez eve r define the goods as "actions attractive to the agent". The subjectivism that Hittinger attributes to Grisez by speak in g in t his way is utterly without foundation in a nyt hin g that Grisez has written a nd is totall y at varian ce with his ent ire wo rk.
A central c harge levelled by Hittinger agai nst Grisez and F innis is that their account of the natural law is more Kantian than Thomistic insofar as it posit s a non-rational intuition of th e prim ary precepts of the nat ura l law and does not show how nature is "normati ve." that is . how natural law precepts a re grounded in philosophical anthropology and metaph ys ics. This c harge is simp ly fa lse. In their treatment of the first prece pts of the natural law. G risez and Finnis ex plicitl y base th eir work on the thought ofSt. Thomas. The Commo n Doctor in sisted th at the/irst principles of practical reason or of the natural law. like the first principles of speculative inquiry, are com pletely underivedfrom anyt hin g prior to them; otherwise they would not be " first" or "primary." Aquinas's point -and the point which Grisez a nd Finnis make too -is that there are propositions of practical reason , rooted in the concept of the "good," which are self-ev ident ly true or per se nota. Among these a re the propositions that "good is to be done and pursued and its opposite (evi l) is to be avoided ," a nd , as Aquinas himself wr ites, (Summa Theologiae, 1-2, q. 94, a. 2), "all those things that reaso n na turally a pprehends as good ," i.e ., a ll those goods to which we are naturally inclined, are goods to be pursued and done and their oppos ites are evi ls to be avoided.
Nor does this mean that Grise z and Finnis are inso uci an t or unaware of the relationship between a so und meta physics a nd anthropology a nd a so und moral theory. These go together; but we do not derive our knowledge of the natural law by deducing it from our knowledge of human nature; persons who may well have a very erroneous understanding of human na ture (e.g. , a behavioris t) might well know what they are req uired to do by the mora l law. Moreover, both Grisez and Finnis insist that were our nature oth er than it is, then the goods perfective of us and orie ntin g us dynamically toward them would be different than they act ually a re. Moreover, both aut hors, an d part icularly Gr isez, have written at length to criticize the fa lse du a lism of modern philosophy and theology which denigrates the good of human bodily life. Grisez, moreover, has writt en at length in criticism of modern determinist philosophies and has amply defended suc h anthropo logical truths as the freedom of self-determination.
In Hittin ger's account, (cf. H, pp. 53 ff) , the Grisez-Finnis theory emphasizes o ne's own self-fulfillment and the avoidance of unn ecessary se lf limitation. He says (p. 87) that their theory "seems to limit the motivation a l life of practica l reason merely to a concern. or respect, for modes of one's own well-being and fulfillment." This claim is a serious injustice to Grisez and Finnis and simp ly ignores what they actua lly say. Within sentences of one passage that Hittinger cites ou t of the context to sup port his claim, Grisez, for instance, had this to say: "T he idea l of integral human fulfillment is that of a single system in which all the goods of human persons would contribute to the fulfillment of the who le community of persons." A nd shortl y la ter. in the same sect ion of hi s wri tin gs from which Hittinger cites a passage to prove Grisez's individ ualism, Grisez writes: " Integra l human fulfillment is not individualistic sati sfaction of desires; it is the realization of a ll the human goods in the whole hu man community" (cf. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, p. 186).
I could co ntinue to note simi lar misrepresentations of the Grisez-Finnis theory found in Hittinger's book. But I think th at I have a lread y show n sufficiently how wide o ff the mark a re Hittinger's claims. The theory he attacks is simply one of his own making. I have been
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Linacre Quarterly studying Grisez and Finnis for years (along with a st ud y of St. Thoma s) . I picked up Hittinger's book. hoping to find in it so me constructive criti cism. or at least a pointing out of a reas that a re not clear a nd need development in the work of Grise z a nd Finnis. But as I rea d the book. I cou ld not believe my eyes . because th e "Grisez-Finnis theory" I found in it was utt erly unrecognizable to one who had spent man y years studying it. I knew somethi ng was wrong . A close in spection of the work and comparison of some key passages with passages in Grisez a nd Finnis showed how poorly Hittinger had don e hi s work. It is sad to re nd er such a ve rdict. but it is the on ly one I can honestly give . 
